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NOTES
SEC V. CREDITORS:
WHY SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE
DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A
REPRIORITIZATION OF SECURITIES
FRAUD CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
SEAN KELLY†
INTRODUCTION
For over forty years there has been a growing tension
between the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil
enforcement mission to protect defrauded securities holders and
bankruptcy law’s treatment of those claimants. Bankruptcy
Code § 510(b) generates this tension by subordinating defrauded
securities holders’ claims, giving them the same priority as
shareholders generally and a lower priority than creditors—
leaving no practical opportunity to recover in bankruptcy. In
response, the SEC utilizes mechanisms in and out of bankruptcy
like fair funds and equitable receiverships to elevate would-be
subordinated securities fraud claims over those of creditors.
This Note examines how this tension has motivated the SEC
to use receiverships as a preferred vehicle to maximize recovery
for defrauded security holders and, in the process, create what
amounts to an SEC-run bankruptcy proceeding. The use of these
receiverships has triggered a high-stakes race to the courthouse
among the SEC and creditors, where mere hours can be the
difference between millions in recovery and nothing at all. To
end this costly race, this Note proposes a solution that seeks to
harmonize securities fraud enforcement with bankruptcy law,
which starts with revisiting Bankruptcy Code § 510(b) to
reprioritize securities fraud claims in bankruptcy.
Part I explains how securities fraud claims are treated in
bankruptcy under § 510(b), illustrating when such claims are
subordinated and the rationale for doing so. Part II provides an
†
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overview of the SEC’s influence in the bankruptcy context from
the Agency’s restricted role in the Code to its empowerment by
Sarbanes-Oxley. Next, Part III.A explains how Sarbanes-Oxley
empowers the SEC to use fair funds to compensate defrauded
security holders in bankruptcy. Similarly, Part III.B explains
how the SEC acts alternatively, out of bankruptcy, through
equitable receiverships to recover for securities fraud victims.
Part IV demonstrates how § 510(b) has motivated the SEC to
avoid bankruptcy altogether, and instead utilize equitable
receiverships as a primary civil enforcement tool to compensate
securities fraud victims of insolvent and near-insolvent entities.
Part IV further illustrates the SEC’s influence over this process,
culminating in receiver distributions that disadvantage creditors.
Accordingly, this use of receiverships has started a race to the
courthouse between the SEC and creditors.
Finally, Part V proposes a solution to harmonize SEC civil
enforcement policies with the Code. This Part offers objectives
for Congress to better integrate securities fraud claims back into
the bankruptcy process. In addition, it suggests practical means
to achieve integration like elevating the United States Trustee to
allow for more coordination with the SEC and the creation of a
receivership-focused SEC position to benefit all securities fraud
victims of insolvent entities—security holders and creditors alike.
I.

THE TREATMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS IN
BANKRUPTCY: § 510(B) AND THE CODE

When an entity collapses, two types of bankruptcy are
available to the insolvent entity: liquidation or reorganization.
Liquidation permits individuals or entities to liquidate their
assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors under Chapter 7 of
the Code.1 Reorganization allows high-income individuals and
business entities to reorganize their debts and continue
operations upon filing under Chapter 11.2 In Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 cases, the Bankruptcy Code provides a fundamental
ordering of payment distributions between equity owners and
creditors that prioritizes creditor claims, ensuring those claims
will be paid in full before equity owners receive any distribution.3

1

11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2012).
Id. §§ 1101–1174.
3
Chapter 7 priority is set under § 726(a). Id. § 726. Chapter 11 reorganization is
set under § 1129(a). Id. § 1129. This ordering in a reorganization, collectively set by
2
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Thus, “at its core, bankruptcy solves a collective action problem
among [self-interested] creditors” that eliminates strategic costs
associated with a race to the courthouse.4
A.

Section 510(b): Mandatory Subordination

Section 510 is an integral part of Bankruptcy Code §§ 501
through 511, which establish an allocation of estate assets among
claimants in liquidation or reorganization cases.5 Within that
section, Congress asked the difficult policy question concerning
the status of a defrauded security-holding claimant who has
sought to rescind a purchase of a security or to sue for damages
based on the purchase: “Should he be treated as a general
unsecured creditor based on his tort claim . . . or should his claim
be subordinated?”6 The answer was mandatory subordination,
embodied in § 510(b), of three types of claims: (1) claims arising
from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security issued by the
debtor or its affiliate; (2) claims for damages arising from the
purchase or sale of such a security; and (3) claims for
reimbursement or contribution on account of these claims.7

§§ 1129 and 510(b) of the Code, is called the absolute priority rule. Id. § 1129;
id. § 510(b).
4
Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the
Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 789 n.11 (2017). The collective action
problem occurs when investors of a firm with value as a going concern lands in
financial distress and causes “each individual investor [to] find it in her [own] selfinterest to try to recover what she is owed without paying attention to the
consequences for everyone else.” Id. at 789. Such efforts tear the firm apart because
“investors are too dispersed to reach an agreement that would put a stop to a
destructive race to the assets[.]” Id.
5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 510.01 (16th ed. 2009) [hereinafter COLLIER].
6
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 194 (1977).
7
11 U.S.C. § 510(b).
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from
rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate
of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a
security, or for reimbursement or contribution allowed under § 502 on
account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that
are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security,
except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same
priority as common stock.
Id. For the seminal article criticizing Congress’ decision to favor subordination and
create § 510(b), see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders
in Corporate Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1 (1983).
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Section 510(b) mandates that security-holding claimants will
be unable to elevate their interests from the level of equity to
general claims.8 Instead, such claims are subordinated to all
claims senior or equal to the claim represented by the security.9
And if the defrauded security claim is common stock, the claim
assumes the same priority as common stock.10 “Put simply,
‘creditors stand ahead of the investors on the receiving line.’ ”11
B. Section 510(b): Theory of Risk Allocation
“Any discussion of section 510(b) must begin with the 1973
law review article authored by Professors John J. Slain and
Homer Kripke . . . .”12 Congress generally adopted Slain and
Kripke’s theory of risk allocation as the foundation for § 510(b).13
The professors argued that “allowing a person to assert a claim in
bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor based on the purchase of an
equity interest impermissibly permitted the buyer of a risky
security to bootstrap himself into a less risky class.”14
Slain and Kripke presented a problem rooted in two risks:
insolvency and illegality.15 Both creditor and security holder
share the first risk of insolvency, but, the professors argued, only
8

COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1].
Id. Mandatory subordination affects all claims arising from transactions
involving “securities.” The Bankruptcy Code provides fifteen examples of securities
in § 101(49)(A). 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A).
10
COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1].
11
In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re
Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
12
In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. at 336 (citing John J. Slain & Homer
Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy—Allocating the
Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973)).
13
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 194, 196 (1977).
14
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 63 (1986).
See, e.g., In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d at 1179 (“[I]t is clear that Congress
embraced Professors Slain and Kripke’s theory of risk allocation, namely, that
general creditors assume a different type of risk with respect to the debtor’s
insolvency than do investors. And not only are general creditors unable to share in
the potential benefits flowing from company success, they rely on the equity cushion
created by the investors’ capital contributions for payment. While Slain and Kripke
focused primarily on shareholder rescission claims, their larger concerns sprang
from what they termed the ‘disaffected stockholder’s efforts to recapture his
investment from the corporation.’ ” (citations omitted)); In re Telegroup, Inc., 281
F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Congress enacted § 510(b) to prevent disappointed
shareholders from recovering their investment loss by using fraud and other
securities claims to bootstrap their way to parity with general unsecured creditors in
a bankruptcy proceeding.”).
15
Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 286.
9
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security holders—who join in the opportunity to enjoy profits of
the entity—assume the risk of illegality in securities issuance.16
Thus, permitting securities fraud claimants to share priority
with general creditors wrongly allocates the risk of illegality to
creditors. In addition, mandatory subordination of the claims of
security holders is supported by creditor reliance on an equity
cushion17 and, since the establishment of the Code, creditor
reliance on subordination to maintain priority over security
holders if bankruptcy occurs.18
By accepting Slain and Kripke’s proposal for mandatory
subordination in § 510(b), Congress, in turn, rejected opposing
arguments—the most vocal of which was from the SEC.19 The
Commission posited that defrauded security holders never
bargained for the securities they received and, consequently,
never actually took on that risk of insolvency.20 Instead, the SEC
argued that “general maxims of bankruptcy give a debtor’s
unsecured creditors equal footing in recovery, whether their
claims sound in tort, breach of contract, or some other cause of
action,” and so posed the question: “[W]hy should shareholder
fraud victims receive different treatment from that accorded
other tort claimants, such as a pedestrian hit by the bankrupt’s
delivery truck?”21 The SEC unsuccessfully argued that defrauded
security holders should be treated like any other tort victim of
the debtor—as a general unsecured tort creditor.22

16

COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[2].
Id. For a critique of this equity cushion analysis, see Davis, Jr., supra note 7,
at 20; Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordination: WorldCom and
the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy,
21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 259, 282–83 (2004).
18
COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[2] (citing Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling
Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206, 213 (2d Cir. 1978) (“When a corporation becomes
bankrupt, the temptation to lay aside the garb of a stockholder, on one pretense or
another, and to assume the role of a creditor, is very strong, and all attempts of that
kind should be viewed with suspicion.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
19
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 195–96 (1977). Ironically, it was the SEC that
argued for principles of absolute priority in the early part of the twentieth century.
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation: The SEC and the Origins of
the Absolute Priority Rule, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 591 (2010).
20
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 195 (1977).
21
Davis, Jr., supra note 7, at 2 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON
S.235 AND S.236, reprinted in The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 738–79 (1975)).
22
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 196 (1977). The SEC argued that “[m]andatory
subordination would result in different treatment to security holders whose fraud
17
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The priority rule embodied in § 510(b) is clear: subordination
is mandatory, regardless of the equities, and any security
holder’s claim under this section will be subordinated until the
claims of general unsecured creditors have been satisfied.23 The
Code’s rigid prioritization rule “makes it unlikely that securities
fraud plaintiffs will receive any distribution” in bankruptcy, with
the practical effect of deterring securities fraud plaintiffs from
pursuing claims against insolvent companies.24 Section 510(b)
protects creditors, and “its language, its legislative history, and
most important, its embodied legislative policy choices, reflect
strong congressional disapproval of investor fraud claims in
bankruptcy.”25
II. THE SEC AND THE CODE
When Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws in 1978, it
rejected the SEC’s position that the Agency’s oversight was
essential to protecting investors in bankruptcy, almost entirely
excluding it from the process.26 But the Agency’s demotion would
not be permanent.27 The SEC’s ability to protect public investors
in and out of bankruptcy would be revived in part by Congress’

claims were reduced to judgment before bankruptcy, and those security holders
whose claim had not reached that point.” Id.
23
COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶¶ 510.04[1], [7].
24
John M. Wunderlich, Bankruptcy’s Protection for Non-Debtors from Securities
Fraud Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 375, 390–91 (2011) (citing In re
ComDisco, Inc., 271 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[U]nder § 510(b) the
securities fraud claims are likely to be subordinated to creditor claims, and dealt
with on the same priority as the shareholder interests . . . . The effect of that
subordination is not possible to predict with certainty. But one very real possibility
is that the plaintiff class claims will be discharged by the plan without any payment.
That will happen if the confirmed plan makes no distribution at the equity level. In
other words, if the reorganization value of the Debtor is insufficient to pay all of the
$4 billion in claims (and if the creditors do not agree to a distribution at the equity
level), then by operation of law the plaintiff’s claims against the Debtor will be
discharged without any possibility of a recovery.”)).
25
In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing In re
Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
26
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy 13 (Univ. of
Pa. L. Sch. Inst. for L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 267, 1999),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=172030 [hereinafter Rise and Fall].
27
David A. Skeel, Jr., Welcome Back, SEC?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573,
573–74 (2010).
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response to the massive accounting fraud scandals that rocked
the country in the early 2000s, and with that came the sustained
restoration of the SEC as an influential party in bankruptcy.28
A.

A Loss of Influence: The Bankruptcy Code

Congress empowers the SEC to protect investors and to
oversee the integrity of the market.29 In the bankruptcy context,
the SEC played a vital role under the Bankruptcy Act, the
Bankruptcy Code’s predecessor.30 But its function under the
Code’s Chapter 11 reorganization was clearly circumscribed so
that, in practice, the SEC would not play a significant role in the
vast majority of cases.31 Instead, “Congress adopted the view
that . . . equity security holders are very often better judges of the
debtor’s economic viability and their own economic self-interest
than courts, trustees, or [governmental agencies such as] the
SEC.”32
Congress did expressly recognize the role of the SEC in
bankruptcy by including it in the “Right to be Heard” section of
the Code.33 That said, the legislative history of § 1109 confirms
that Congress intended a substantially modified role for the
Commission.34 Congress explained that the SEC’s tapered role
would enable the Bankruptcy Court to better evaluate all sides of
a position to determine the public interest, unlike under the
Bankruptcy Act, where SEC influence made that determination

28

Id. at 578; Alistaire Bambach & Samuel R. Maizel, The SEC’s Role in Public
Company Bankruptcy Cases Where There Is a Significant Enforcement Interest, 2005
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 3 (2006). Alistaire Bambach is the Assistant Regional
Director and Chief Bankruptcy Counsel to the Division of Enforcement of the SEC.
Her expressed views do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, but as
the SEC’s top bankruptcy lawyer since 2001, her views are highly influential in the
Commission’s enforcement strategy in bankruptcy.
29
The SEC’s stated mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html.
30
COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 1109.03[4].
31
Id.
32
Id. ¶ 1109.LH[1][d] (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 458 n.28 (1999)).
33
Id. ¶ 1109.LH[1][d]. The legislative history makes clear that the SEC is not a
party in interest under § 1109(b), meaning the Commission may not file a
reorganization plan. Id. Under the Code, § 1109(a) provides that the SEC “may raise
and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 case, but “may not
appeal from any judgment, order, or decree entered in the case.” 11 U.S.C. 1109(a)
(2012).
34
COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 1109.LH[1][d].
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“only in terms of the interest of public security holders.”35 To
complete the Agency’s diminished role in bankruptcy, Congress
created the United States Trustee, an arm of the Department of
Justice, to act as the watchdog of bankruptcy and subsume much
of the SEC’s function prior to the Code.36
B. A Provision of Power: Sarbanes-Oxley
The SEC’s bankruptcy revival began with the massive
accounting fraud cases that ended in bankruptcy, like WorldCom
and Enron.37 These “mega-cases” precipitated Congress’ passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and, by extension, led to the
SEC’s resurgence as an important participant in bankruptcy
proceedings.38 In brief, Sarbanes-Oxley resulted in a broad grant
of power that allowed the SEC to “ratchet[] up” financial
penalties to reinject faith in the markets and “enhance
deterrence and accountability.”39
The SEC recognized Sarbanes-Oxley as an innovative
legislative response to the financial and legal obstacles that
hampered its ability to compensate defrauded security holders.40
Three provisions of the Act helped clear those obstacles. First,
§ 305(b) authorized federal courts in actions brought by the SEC
to grant any equitable relief that may be appropriate to benefit

35

Id. (The modified “advisory role of the SEC will enable the court to balance
the needs relating to the economy.”).
36
28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 109 (1977) (The U.S. Trustee
will “operate much as the Securities and Exchange Commission operates under
current Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, protecting the public interest and
ensuring that bankruptcy cases are conducted according to the law.”).
37
Bambach & Maizel, supra note 28.
38
Skeel, Jr., supra note 27, at 578.
39
NICOLE A. BAKER ET AL., SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND
STRATEGIES 197 (2007) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL] (citing Stephen M.
Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 24th Annual Ray
Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004)).
40
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE
SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 1 (2003) [hereinafter SECTION 308(C) REPORT].
As required by Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the staff of the
Commission has conducted a review and analysis of its enforcement actions
over the five years preceding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
identify how such proceedings may best be utilized to provide restitution
for injured investors. This report summarizes the findings and conclusions
of that review.
Id.

2018]

SEC V. CREDITORS

923

investors.41 Next, in providing the link between securities fraud
actions
and
bankruptcy,
“[s]ection
803 . . . amended
the . . . Bankruptcy Code to make debts incurred for federal
securities
law
violations”—including
penalties
and
42
disgorgement—“non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.” Finally, the
Federal Account for Investor Restitution (“FAIR”) Fund
provision43 in § 308(a) authorized the SEC to take civil penalties
collected in enforcement actions—previously required to be paid
to the United States Treasury—and add them to disgorgement
funds to benefit victims of securities law violations.44
Collectively, Sarbanes-Oxley and these specific provisions
significantly improved the capabilities and altered the strategy of
SEC civil enforcement authority.45
III.A. SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO COMPENSATE
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMANTS IN BANKRUPTCY: FAIR FUNDS
Section 308(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Fair Fund Provision,
was a direct response to the large discrepancy created by
corporate fraud cases between the amount in dollars lost and the
amount that regulators could ever hope to collect in disgorgement
alone.46 The SEC saw the Fair Fund provision as a powerful

41

ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 184–85. This provision would
provide the statutory underpinning for the broad authority provided to SEC
receivers. See infra Part III.B.
42
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 207. The bankruptcy provision in
§ 803 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits individuals from obtaining discharge of
the Commission’s disgorgement claims; previously, only penalties were
automatically nondischargeable. Id. The new provision enables the Commission to
preserve its claims for both disgorgement and penalties, and thereby increases
potential assets for collection. Id.
43
Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 333 n.4 (2015) (citing Pub. L.
No. 107-204, §308, 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246
(2012))).
44
SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 29–30; ENFORCEMENT MANUAL,
supra note 39, at 197. Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that accounts for any
“ill-gotten gain[s]” stemming from the fraud. Id. at 203.
45
Zack Christensen, The Fair Funds for Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley:
Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 340–41
(2005). Sarbanes-Oxley has been labeled “the most sweeping federal law concerning
corporate governance since the adoption of the initial federal securities laws in 1933
and 1934.” Id. at 375 n.11 (quoting Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J.
CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)); SECTION 308(C) REPORT,
supra note 40, at 1.
46
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 207–08.
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vehicle to supplement its enforcement initiatives and
significantly increase compensation for defrauded security
holders.47 But to creditors, § 308(a) worked a “sea change” in the
SEC’s powers and responsibilities, changing its focus from
deterrence of securities fraud to after-the-fact compensation for
defrauded security holders.48
The Fair Fund provision enabled the SEC to increase
collections in enforcement actions by combining penalty and
disgorgement amounts into a fair fund used to compensate
injured investors at the discretion of the Commission.49
Accordingly, the SEC—a government agency treated as an
unsecured creditor in the Code’s priority—used § 308(a) to
compensate securities fraud claimants in bankruptcy who were
otherwise subordinated pursuant to § 510(b). This end run on
§ 510(b) created a tension between the Bankruptcy Code and
Sarbanes-Oxley that came to a head in the highly publicized
WorldCom bankruptcy case.50

47
SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22 (“Making appropriate
distributions to investors, by applying the Fair Fund provision, is a desirable and
important objective. The Commission intends to use the provision whenever
reasonably possible, consistent with its mission to protect investors.”). One past SEC
enforcement director described the Fair Fund provision as “ ‘[o]ne of the most
frequently used tools’ created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.” Velikonja, supra note 43,
at 334 n.14 (quoting Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley
Turns Six: An Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 393, 411 (2008)).
48
Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded
Investors?, 63 BUS. L. 317, 342 (2008) (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter WorldCom])
(The Second Circuit rejected the “sea change” argument, instead viewing the Fair
Fund provision as a tool that increased available funds for the SEC to distribute at
its discretion).
49
SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22. “Because section 308(a) only
permit[ted] penalty amounts to be distributed to investors if there [was] also a
disgorgement . . . the [SEC] adopted the practice of ordering $1 in disgorgement in
[accounting fraud] cases where there [was] no identifiable unjust enrichment but the
Commission want[ed] to distribute a penalty to investors.” ENFORCEMENT MANUAL,
supra note 39, at 208 n.134. This practice, used in WorldCom, has not continued in a
significant way since then. Velikonja, supra note 43, at 392–93.
50
The WorldCom court itself recognized the tension between the Fair Fund
provision and § 510(b). 467 F.3d at 85 (“We recognize . . . that there is tension
between the priority assigned to claims under the Bankruptcy Code and the Fair
Fund provision[.]”). Indeed, the Enron court even noted “that some have argued that
Congress effectively created an exception to the absolute priority rule and the
priority regime under the Bankruptcy Code when it enacted [Sarbanes-Oxley].” In re
Enron Corp., 341 B.R. 141, 169–70 n.25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc.
v. SEC presents the definitive clash between the Fair Fund
provision and § 510(b).51
In brief, WorldCom entered into
Chapter 11 bankruptcy after revealing fraud on a multibilliondollar scale.52 As a result, the SEC brought a civil action as an
unsecured creditor for $2.25 billion that, under the terms of the
reorganization plan, would be satisfied by the bankruptcy estate
for $500 million in cash and $250 million in the company’s new
common stock.53 Thus, the Fair Fund provision permitted the
SEC to recover and distribute $750 million—which would
normally go to creditors—to defrauded security holders otherwise
automatically subordinated under § 510(b).54
WorldCom garnered much “scholarly and popular
criticism.”55 However, Professor Urska Velikonja, in a first-ever
empirical review of the SEC’s use of fair funds, determined that
“WorldCom is the exception, not the rule, for fair fund
distributions” in accounting fraud cases.56 The study revealed
that the SEC instead used fair funds more often to compensate
victims from individual and third-party defendants separate from
the bankruptcy estate.57 Accordingly, the WorldCom bankruptcy

51
The WorldCom discussion that follows should be taken as a cursory overview
only, meant to provide a background for what led the Commission to adopt a
strategy that avoids bankruptcy altogether. For a full analysis of the interaction and
competition between competing principles and purposes of the Fair Fund provision
and § 510(b) through an in-depth analysis of the WorldCom case, see Christensen,
supra note 45 (concluding that Congress should amend the Fair Fund provision to
prevent it from making an end run on § 510(b) and Bankruptcy Code priority). Cf.
Henry, supra note 17, at 262 (concluding that the Fair Funds provision’s effect on
the distribution of funds in bankruptcy is the “appropriate response to our evolving
financial markets”).
52
Christensen, supra note 45, at 355.
53
Id. at 356.
54
Id.
55
Velikonja, supra note 43, at 367 (citing Black, supra note 48, at 332–33; Mark
J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends
the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1285–86 (2013) (explaining that fair
fund distributions “directly contradict[]” bankruptcy priority)); Skeel, Jr., supra note
27, at 584 (“The bankruptcy laws ordinarily subordinate a shareholder’s securities
claims, but the SEC has evaded this rule and ignored the priority framework[.]”);
Christensen, supra note 45, at 375 (arguing that Congress should amend the Fair
Fund provision to prevent it from “alter[ing] the well-established distributional
priorities of the Bankruptcy Code”).
56
Velikonja, supra note 43, at 367. “There is no empirical support for the
allegation that the SEC’s fair fund distributions systematically overcompensate
defrauded shareholders.” Id. at 368.
57
Id.
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estate’s payment to the SEC does not represent a widespread
enforcement practice in handling similar accounting fraud
cases.58
Still, for the SEC, WorldCom represents “the one published
decision on point [that] makes clear that the SEC’s goal of
returning money to defrauded investors trumps those concerns
about bankruptcy priorities.”59 The Commission’s transcendental
view of its noble mission to protect defrauded security holders
through compensation, and its corresponding indifference toward
the Bankruptcy Code, continues to pervade the Agency’s civil
enforcement strategy. That view came to a high-water mark in
SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc.,60 where the SEC
argued that the court should find its disgorgement claim had
priority over a secured creditor’s claim in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding—an argument in direct contravention of
the Code.61
III.B. SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO COMPENSATE
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMANTS OUT OF BANKRUPTCY: THE
EQUITABLE RECEIVERSHIP
An additional response to the massive accounting frauds
that led to Sarbanes-Oxley was the SEC’s implementation of a
“ ‘real-time’ enforcement initiative.”62 To carry out this initiative,
the SEC more frequently sought: (1) temporary restraining
orders and asset freezes to identify and stop fraudulent activity,
and (2) the appointment of receivers to effectively compensate
security holders.63 Section 308(c) of Sarbanes-Oxley required the
SEC to analyze its enforcement actions involving civil penalties
or disgorgement in order to identify the most efficient methods to
provide restitution to injured investors.64 The report found that
its real-time enforcement initiative and, notably, the
appointment of a receiver, “enhance[d] the Commission’s ability
to maximize investor recovery.”65 And because implementing a
distribution plan for amounts deposited into a fair fund in large

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Bambach & Maizel, supra note 28.
98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 535.
SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 40, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
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and complex cases was proving cumbersome,66 equitable
receiverships developed as an alternative to bankruptcy to allow
the SEC to more effectively compensate defrauded security
holders.67
A receivership’s authority stems from the inherent equitable
powers of federal courts to craft remedies that supplement
Congress’ grant of statutory authority to the SEC.68 Here,
§ 305(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley provided the statutory underpinning
that supplements the use of receiverships in securities fraud
actions.69 It allows the SEC to frequently seek receivers in
situations of insolvency or near insolvency to wind down
distressed, fraudulent entities and to compensate defrauded
security holders.70
The appointed receiver, the person who runs an equitable
receivership, is an agent of the court, intended to act
independently of the SEC in carrying out its prescribed duties.71
Accordingly, the receiver must seek the court’s approval for
specific actions.72 And because the SEC requests receivers under
the court’s equitable authority, SEC receiverships are, by
definition, equitable receiverships, meaning that the receiver’s
powers and duties are set by a district court’s appointment order.
A typical receiver appointment order includes standard
powers and duties needed to execute the receivership. The
following is an example from an appointment order for Platinum

66

ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 208.
Alistaire Bambach, The SEC in Bankruptcy: Past and Present, 18 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 607, 611 (2010) [hereinafter Past and Present]. Judge Posner noted in
Scholes v. Lehmann that “[c]orporate bankruptcy proceedings are not famous for
expedition . . . and whatever advantages they may have over receiverships in a case
such as this—if any, and none has been pointed out to us—are not ones that the
defendants in these fraudulent conveyance actions should be heard to trumpet.” 56
F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995).
68
Keith Miller, Regulatory Litigation with the SEC, 7 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED.
CTS. § 79:47 (4th ed. 2017).
69
Id. Section 305(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley amended 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) to add,
“In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any
provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court
may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit
of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2012).
70
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 39, at 217. The SEC’s authority to
request and select a receiver can be found in § 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
§ 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
71
Miller, supra note 68, § 79:48.
72
Id.
67
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Management.73 The order first finds the appointment “necessary
and appropriate for the purposes of marshaling and preserving
all assets” of the entity, with enumerated goals that include “an
orderly wind down,” “a responsible liquidation of assets[,] and
orderly and fair distribution of those assets to investors.”74 In
addition, the appointed receiver is granted “all powers,
authorities, rights and privileges” to assume management and
control of the receivership entities’ claims and property.75 This
general language illustrates a district court’s broad grant of
power and authority to SEC receivers76 and provides insight into
why the SEC would prefer a receivership to bankruptcy—a
preference further analyzed in Part IV.
IV. INEQUITABLE RECEIVERSHIPS
When the question arises whether bankruptcy or liquidation
through an equity receivership is appropriate,77 the SEC knows
the receivership advantage—“no absolute priority rule.”78 As a
result, receiverships have evolved to become the preferred vehicle
for the SEC to compensate securities fraud victims of insolvent
73
Order Appointing Receiver at 1–2, SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al.,
No. 16-cv-06848-KAM (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Platinum
Receiver Order].
74
Id. at 1–2. Additional enumerated responsibilities of the receiver include:
to (i) preserve the status quo, (ii) ascertain the extent of commingling of
funds among the Receivership Entities; (iii) ascertain the true financial
condition of the Receivership Entities and the disposition of investor funds;
(iv) prevent further dissipation of the property and assets of the
Receivership Entities; (v) prevent the encumbrance or disposal of property
or assets of the Receivership Entities; (vi) preserve the books, records and
documents of the Receivership Entities; (vii) be available to respond to
investor inquiries; [and] (viii) protect investors’ assets[.]
Id. at 2.
75
Id. at 2–3.
76
The remaining, pertinent section headings illustrate the SEC receiver’s
powers: “II. Access to Information . . . III. Access to Books, Records and
Accounts . . . IV. Access to Real and Personal Property . . . V. Notice to Third
Parties . . . VI. Injunction Against Interference with Receiver . . . VII. Stay of
Litigation . . . VIII. Managing Assets . . . IX. Investigate and Prosecute Claims . . . X.
Bankruptcy Filing . . . XI. Liability of Receiver . . . XII. Recommendations and
Reports . . . XIII. Fees, Expenses and Accountings.” Id. at 5–17.
77
Alistaire Bambach, Issues That the SEC Confronts in the Liquidation of
Hedge Funds, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125, 127 (2014) [hereinafter Hedge
Funds].
78
Id. The SEC also recognizes that “[t]he benefit of bankruptcy is established
case law that governs the liquidation of an entity, an experienced judge whose
primary responsibility is to oversee liquidations and reorganizations, and the
participation of the United States Trustee and other key constituents.” Id.
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entities outside of the Code’s strictures: “To the extent that the
courts permit [the SEC] to use equity receiverships in a way that
maximizes value to defrauded investors and the estate as a
whole, [the SEC] will pursue their use.”79
Thus, the same distribution system that aimed to prevent
the race to the courthouse among self-interested creditors—
§ 510(b)80—has led to the SEC’s strategic use of receiverships out
of bankruptcy and the start of a new race to the courthouse: SEC
v. Creditors. This Part aims to show how and why the SEC
utilizes receiverships that disadvantage creditors through the
Agency’s pervasive influence over the process—from the
receiver’s initial nomination and appointment to the proposed
and accepted distribution plans—and concludes with an analysis
of a recent case to exemplify the high stakes in this race.
A.

SEC Influence Over SEC Receivers

A receiver is procedurally and nominally an independent
officer of, and appointed by, the court.81 That said, it is the SEC
who nominates the receiver and exerts significant influence over
the receiver in subsequent proceedings.82 In fact, a stated SEC
advantage of a receiver over a bankruptcy trustee is that
receivers are mandated to cooperate with law enforcement,
facilitating greater SEC staff oversight in receivership
proceedings.83
A recent example from the Platinum
Management84 receivership illustrates the Commission’s
influence over a receiver’s decision-making.

79

Past and Present, supra note 67, at 612–13. “In some instances, equity
receiverships are superior to bankruptcy filings because the receiver is a fiduciary to
the estate . . . [who] can fashion a plan that is supported by the Commission, and
treats investors and creditors fairly.” Id. at 612.
80
See supra Part I.B.
81
See supra Part III.B.
82
This Note’s research into active receiverships has failed to find an instance
where the SEC-nominated receiver was not accepted by the court. Further, many
receivers will be appointed to multiple SEC receiverships.
83
Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127.
84
On December 19, 2016, the SEC “charged the founder of Platinum Partners
and the investment managers of two of its flagship hedge funds with conducting a
fraudulent scheme to inflate asset values and illicitly move investor money to cover
losses and liquidity problems.” Litigation Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges Platinum Funds and Founder with Defrauding Investors (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23704.htm.
The
receiver
was
appointed the same day the SEC brought its complaint against Platinum.
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Just six months after appointment, the SEC-nominated
receiver for Platinum Management resigned due to differing
views with agency staff on how the receivership should
progress.85 Notably, after the receiver’s resignation, the SEC
proposed an amended order appointing a substitute receiver that
highlighted the Agency’s view of how the independent
receivership should proceed.86 In the “Managing Assets” section
of the order, the SEC proposed an entirely new paragraph that
mandated: “The Receiver may engage in [any liquidation
transaction that involves Receivership Property whose valuation
is $1 million or more] only upon submission of such transactions
for review and comment by the SEC staff and upon motion and
approval of the Court.”87 This rejected language would have
allowed the SEC to hijack the receivership proceeding.88 Such
proposals diminish confidence in the receiver to act as an
independent officer of the court in the best interests of security
holders and creditors alike, and instead transform an equitable
receivership into a functional arm of the SEC.89

85

According to the receiver, SEC staff pressured the receiver, an independent
officer of the court, to implement a quick liquidation of all positions, rather than the
receiver’s plan to also invest limited, additional funds to make potential returns for
investors and creditors. Letter from Celia Goldwag Barenholtz, Counsel, Cooley
LLP, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y., Exhibit 1
(June 23, 2017) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.) (requesting
approval of resignation of Receiver Bart Schwartz in the case of SEC v. Platinum
Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (2016)). Lawrence Delevingne,
Platinum Receiver Asks to Resign over Disagreements with SEC, REUTERS (June 26,
2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds-platinum/platinumreceiver-asks-to-resign-over-disagreements-with-sec-idUSKBN19H216.
86
Blacklined Proposed Second Amended Order Appointing Receiver, SEC v.
Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (June 26, 2017), ECF No.
174-2 [hereinafter Blacklined Proposed Receiver Order].
87
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
88
The blacklined, second amended substitution proposal included two more
problematic suggestions. First, in the “Bankruptcy Filing” section, the authorization
to file voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 now hinged “upon consultation
with the SEC staff.” Id. at 15. Next, in the “Recommendations and Reports” section
that authorizes the Receiver to develop a “Liquidation Plan,” the amended order
stipulated that authorization hinged “upon consultation with the SEC staff.” Id. at
16–17.
89
Non-party shareholders and creditors expressed concern over the amended
order. See, e.g., Response to Dkt. No. 173 Motion to Appoint Substitute Receiver,
SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 29,
2017), ECF No. 186; Indep. Inv’rs’ Response to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Application
for an Order to Show Cause (Dkt. No. 174), SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY) LLC et al.,
No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 201; Statement of Position
by Non-Parties Beechwood Re Ltd. & Beechwood Bermuda Int’l Ltd. Concerning
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B. The “Sea Change”: SEC v. Byers and the Anti-Bankruptcy
Injunction
In SEC v. Byers, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s acceptance of SEC language to “Enjoin the Filing of
Bankruptcy” in a proposed receiver appointment order,90
effectively foreclosing use of the involuntary bankruptcy
provision in § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.91
This antibankruptcy injunction is critical to the SEC receiver’s
effectiveness; it provides relief from involuntary bankruptcy
petitions by creditors and acts like an automatic stay in a true
bankruptcy proceeding.92 This Section shows how the Byers
holding empowers SEC receivers with broad discretion to conduct
a quasi-bankruptcy proceeding.93
The creditors committee of Wextrust—the insolvent entity at
issue in Byers—challenged the district court’s authority to enter
the proposed anti-bankruptcy injunction, arguing that § 303 of
the Code granted creditors an absolute right to commence an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor.94 But the
court held that “district courts may issue anti-litigation
injunctions barring bankruptcy filings as part of their broad
equitable powers” in an SEC receivership.95
This holding
entrenches the receivership, forsaking creditors’ reliance on the
Bankruptcy Code: “Simply put, there is no unwaivable right to
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, and, even if there were,

SEC’s Application for Appointment of New Receiver, SEC v. Platinum Mgmt. (NY)
LLC et al., No. 16-cv-06848-BMC (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 205-1.
90
SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2010).
91
11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (“An involuntary case may be commenced only
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family
farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation,
that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced.”).
92
Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 386 (“The automatic stay is a fundamental
aspect of the Code because it provides the debtor a ‘breathing spell’ from creditors
and collection actions.”).
93
The underlying facts: “[The SEC] filed a complaint against Stephen Byers,
Joseph Shereshevsky, [and five Wextrust entities]. The SEC complaint alleged a
massive Ponzi scheme that involved some 240 Wextrust affiliates operating in the
United States, Middle East and Africa, and that reportedly defrauded investors of
approximately $255 million.” Byers, 609 F.3d at 89–90.
94
Id. at 91.
95
Id. In addition, the court affirmed the district court’s order permitting the
Receiver to continue to serve as manager should a bankruptcy proceeding be
commenced—acknowledging that the receiver automatically becomes debtor in
possession by operation of law. Id. at 93.
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the receivership accomplishes what a bankruptcy would. The
receivership protects the assets of the estate, just as a stay would
in bankruptcy.”96
While the court stressed that these anti-bankruptcy
provisions should be “exercised cautiously” and “sparsely,” these
provisions are a staple in SEC receiver requests, providing a
crucial parallel to an automatic stay in bankruptcy.97 The result
in Byers arguably promoted a “sea change” in SEC civil
enforcement strategy, leading to bankruptcy-like liquidations by
SEC receivers without the Code’s uniformity, structure, or
creditor protections.
The full extent of the SEC’s strategy is evidenced in active
SEC receiver distribution plans.98 For example, in Byers, the
Wextrust receiver set forth a pro rata distribution of funds to
each security holder and unsecured creditor, explaining the

96

Id. at 92. The differences in the bankruptcy stay and the anti-bankruptcy
injunction in receivership illustrate the comparative pros and cons of the two
systems. The bankruptcy stay allows a company the breathing room to reorganize
and potentially come out of bankruptcy. If the fraud is so pervasive that the
company cannot be made out of reorganization, then a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding might be the better option. In the anti-bankruptcy injunction—which
operates as a bankruptcy stay for the receivership proceeding—the receiver does not
maintain the power to reorganize. Thus, the SEC utilizes the injunction to provide
the receivership the ability to quickly ascertain the state of the entity, make the
appropriate liquidations, and distribute the recovered funds to defrauded investors.
97
Id. at 89, 91. The court emphasized that this was not a broad power to be
exercised. In a separate part of the opinion, in stating its holding that the court
disagreed with the creditors’ argument that the district court lacked authority to
subvert their right to petition for involuntary bankruptcy by issuing the antilitigation injunction, the court held: “while it should be sparsely exercised, district
courts possess the authority and discretion to enter anti-litigation orders, including
those that bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions absent the district
court’s permission.” Id. at 89. Similarly, in considering that a receiver may not be
equipped, experienced, or prepared for the administration of a complex liquidation,
the Second Circuit instructed the SEC to inform district courts of the circuit court’s
view that equity receiverships should not be used to effect the liquidation of
defendants in actions brought under the securities laws. SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade,
Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1987).
98
“To the extent that the courts permit [the SEC] to use equity receiverships in
a way that maximizes value to defrauded investors and the estate as a whole, [the
SEC] will pursue their use.” Past and Present, supra note 67, at 613. This Note’s
findings are based on the listed links that were either active or included a receiver’s
specific website that was active. Receiverships, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/receiverships.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
This Note does not address, discuss, or explain the different types of methods
employed by receivers. For a more insightful analysis on the subject, see Kathy
Bazoian Phelps, Handling Claims in Ponzi Scheme Bankruptcy and Receivership
Cases, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 572–77 (2012).
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similar treatment in a footnote: “In this regard, defrauded
investors may be viewed as tort creditors with contingent,
unliquidated, and potentially disputed claims.”99 The Wextrust
receiver’s reprioritization of claims to treat defrauded security
holders on a pro rata basis with unsecured creditors is not
uncommon—it is widespread practice.100 Indeed, every active
receivership listed on the SEC’s website treats the claims of
defrauded security holders on an equal-to101 or preferred basis to
creditors.102 Thus, the SEC—through its receiver—has perfected
99
Receiver’s Proposed Plan of Distribution at 7, 27 n.29, SEC v. Byers et al., No.
08 Civ. 7104 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009).
100
See, e.g., Receiver’s Motion (I) to Set Amount of Disputed Claims & (II)
Establish Procedure to Calculate Claims Distribution at 11, SEC v. Estate of
Kenneth Wayne Mcleod et al., No. 10-22078-cv-FAM (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2013)
(distributing claims to defrauded security holders and creditors on a pro rata basis);
Receiver’s Final Report & Proposed Distribution at 9–10, SEC v. Secure Inv. Servs.,
Inc. et al., No. 2:07-Cv-01724 Geb Cmk (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (same); Motion to
Approve Plan of Distribution at ¶ 17, SEC v. Brian A. Bjork, No. 4:11-Cv-2830 (S.D.
Tex. 2013) (same); Order Approving Receiver’s Interim Distribution Plan at 6, SEC
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd. et al., No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2013)
(same); Report of the Receiver Dated November 29, 2012 & Request for Interim
Distribution at 11, SEC v. Millennium Bank et al., No. 7:09-CV-050-O (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 11, 2012) (same); Plan for Claims Admin. & Distribution of Proceeds at 10, SEC
vs. Travis E. Correll et al., No. 4:05-Cv-472 Ras (E.D. Tex. 2008) (same); Receiver’s
Motion for Authorization to Make an Initial Distribution to Creditors with
Undisputed Claims & Request to Set a Hearing to Resolve Disputed Claims at 7 n.
10, SEC v. John P. Utsick, et al., No. 06-20975-CIV-HUCK/O’Sullivan (S.D. Fla. Dec.
10, 2008) (same); Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Interim Distribution Plan &
Entry of Claims Bar Date at 12, SEC v. James G. Temme, No. 4:11-Cv-655 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 29, 2014) (same).
101
See, e.g., Receiver’s Motion to Approve Plan of Distribution & Memorandum
of Law in Support at 18, 2017 WL 4174217 (N.D. Ga. 2017), SEC v. Angelo A. Alleca
et al. (No. 1:12-CV-3261-WSD), 2017 WL 5953189 (“Allowed Claims of investors and
of trade creditors are proposed to stand on equal footing, and therefore the Receiver
proposes no classes of Claims.”); Receiver’s Motion to Establish Claims Procedure
Plan & to Approve Claim Forms & Brief in Support at 13, SEC v. Edward T. Stein
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-03125-RJS) (“The treatment of claims by
creditors on equal footing with defrauded investors was specifically considered and
approved by the Byers court under similar circumstances . . . . The Receiver believes
that the limitation of Creditor claims to amounts originally owed, exclusive of
interest, late fees or penalties, is equitable and appropriately places Creditors on
equal footing with Investors for recovery from the Estate’s limited assets.”); Plan for
Claims Admin. & Distribution of Proceeds at 10, SEC vs. Travis E. Correll et al.
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 4:05-Cv-472 Ras) (“Approved Claims of Investors and
unsecured Creditors are general unsecured claims against the Receiver Estate and
shall be paid with equal priority.”).
102
See, e.g., Amended Joint Plan of Distribution for Atlantic Asset Mgmt., LLC
Filed by Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Marti P. Murray, as Receiver at 12–13, SEC v.
Atlantic Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9764 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (establishing a
general distribution that included investor claims, and only allowed unsecured
creditors to participate on a pro rata basis with investors in any supplemental
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an end run around the Code’s mandatory subordination and
§ 510(b), answering its own question from forty years earlier—
securities fraud victims should not “receive different treatment
from that accorded . . . a pedestrian hit by the bankrupt’s
delivery truck.”103
If the Byers court had not affirmed the exercise of an antibankruptcy injunction that foreclosed § 303 of the Code, then
creditors would have the right to force an insolvent entity into
bankruptcy. So many, if not most, of these distribution plans
would be vastly different where, now under the Code, defrauded
security holders would be automatically subordinated under
§ 510(b).104 Such is the critical importance of the combined
receiver and anti-bankruptcy injunction to the SEC. It creates a

distribution thereafter); Receiver’s Motion for Court Approval of Proposed Claims
Process at 6, SEC v. Commodities Online, LLC et al., No. 11-60702-Civ-Cooke/Torres
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 6. 2015) (basing priority on the available money for distribution, and
since the available money was insufficient to fully compensate the defrauded
investors, subordinating all non-investor claims); Receiver’s Motion to Authorize
First Interim Distribution, Establish Record Dates & Set First Interim Distribution
Date at 5, 5 nn.3–5, SEC v. Rex Venture Group, LLC et al., No. 3:12-CV-519
(W.D.N.C. 2014) (“[T]here will be no distribution to . . . Class 2, 4 or 5 Claims,”
which include “claims . . . secured by collateral,” “[c]laims asserted by taxing
authorities,” and “[c]laims asserted by general unsecured creditors.”); Receiver’s
Unopposed Motion to (1) Approve First Interim Distribution, (2) Establish Reserves,
& (3) Approve Revisions to Certain Claim Determinations at 5–6, SEC v. Arthur
Nadel et al.; No. 8:09-cv-87-T-26TBM (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2012) (placing investors
first in line, before secured creditor claims, and unsecured creditor claims third in
line—only if all allowed amounts for defrauded investor claims had been satisfied in
full); Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Plan of Distribution of Receivership Estate at
7, SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp. et al., No. 04-60573-Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(determining that no trade creditors would receive distributions “[b]ecause there
[would] be insufficient funds to satisfy the investor claims”); Plaintiff Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n’s Plan for Distribution of Receivership Assets at 4–5, SEC v. Cobalt
Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC et al., No. 06 Civ. 2360 (KMW) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(submitting a distribution plan on a pro rata basis giving 50% to investors, 25% to
unsecured creditors, and 25% to the Receiver and the Receiver’s law firm, with
future recoveries to be distributed as follows: 33.3% to investors, 33.3% to unsecured
creditors, and 33.3% to the Receiver Group).
103
Davis, Jr., supra note 7, at 2 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON
S.235 AND S.236, reprinted in The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on S.235 and S.236 on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 738–79 (1975)); see supra Part I.B.
This Section discusses the SEC’s argument against § 510(b) because “mandatory
subordination would result in different treatment to security holders whose fraud
claims were reduced to judgment before bankruptcy, and those security holders
whose claim had not reached that point.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 196 (1977).
104
11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2012).
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powerful enforcement tool to carry out the Agency’s mission to
protect defrauded security holders through compensation,
without regard for the Bankruptcy Code, its priority, or creditors.
C. The Race Resumed: SEC v. Creditors
The Wextrust creditors committee argued that the district
court should not have been “permitted to write Section 303 out of
the Bankruptcy Code . . . merely because the SEC, which has no
financial stake in the case, prefers receiverships to
bankruptcy.”105 That said, the Second Circuit’s decision in Byers
reinvigorated the collective action problem the Bankruptcy Code
sought to end—the race to the courthouse. But, as the same
creditors recognized in briefing, the race is no longer among selfinterested creditors; it now pits creditors against the SEC.106 The
high stakes of this renewed race, as evidenced in receiver
distribution plans, were exemplified in SEC v. Spongetech
Delivery Systems, Inc., a case filed in 2010 where the SEC lost
the courthouse race by mere hours.107
The SEC charged Spongetech with orchestrating a massive
pump-and-dump scheme that deceived investors into believing
they were buying stock in a highly successful company.108 The
Agency’s civil enforcement action began in a familiar fashion: by
installing its receiver.109 On June 18, 2010, the Commission
moved for the appointment of a receiver—equipped with an antibankruptcy injunction110—over Spongetech, its subsidiaries, and
its affiliates, including its wholly owned subsidiary Dicon
Technologies, LLC.111 The SEC took what appeared to be an
early lead.

105
Reply Brief for Interested Party-Appellants Int’l Ad-Hoc Comm. of Wextrust
Creditors & Int’l Consortium of Wextrust Creditors at 20, SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87
(2d. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-0234-cv(L), 09-0284-cv(CON)).
106
Id. at 4 (“[T]he SEC takes the position that it may foreclose the statutory
rights of Wextrust’s creditors to file involuntary bankruptcy cases simply because it
beat those creditors to the courthouse.”).
107
SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y.
2014).
108
Id. at 543.
109
Notice of Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Motion for Appointment of a
Receiver over Defendant Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc. at 2, SEC v. Spongetech,
98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 44.
110
[Proposed] Order Granting Appointing a Receiver over Defendant
Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc. at 9–10, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530
(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 44-3.
111
Id. at 2.
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But while the Agency hurried to appoint its receiver in
Brooklyn, just three hours earlier, in a Bankruptcy Court in
Savannah, Georgia, three Dicon Technologies creditors sprinted
to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition under § 303 and move
for the immediate appointment of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
trustee.112
Those creditors succeeded, and a trustee was
appointed over Dicon on July 9, 2010.113 Unlike in Byers, the
Dicon creditors won the race to the courthouse. Accordingly,
Dicon’s parent, Spongetech, eventually entered its own Chapter
11 bankruptcy with a trustee appointment.114 The loss forced the
SEC to withdraw its receiver request115 because, as the Agency
pointed out, “the bankruptcy trustee would undertake many of
the same functions as a Receiver.”116

112

Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. (June 21,
2010) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.) (informing court of Dicon
creditors’ involuntary bankruptcy petition and motion for appointment of a
bankruptcy trustee in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Georgia) [hereinafter Tao Letter]. The Bankruptcy Code allows the Court to
appoint a Chapter 11 trustee “for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case,” or “if such appointment is in the
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate.”
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (2) (2012).
113
Tao Letter, supra note 112.
114
Following the Dicon petition, Spongetech filed for bankruptcy in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In addition, the United
States Trustee appeared, and filed an expedited motion supporting the immediate
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee over Spongetech. Motion of the U.S. Trustee for
Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee or, in the Alternative,
Converting the Case to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F.
Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (No. 10-CV-2031 (DLI)) ECF No. 91-4. Even
so, the SEC continued to argue for a receivership instead of bankruptcy. Plaintiff
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appointment of
a Receiver, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2010) (No. 10CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 91. But the Bankruptcy Court accepted the United States
Trustee’s request and directed the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee over
Spongetech. Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.
(July 20, 2010) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.).
115
Letter from Jeffrey T. Tao, Assistant Chief Litig. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, to Dora L. Irizarry, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. (July 20,
2010) (on file with the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y.).
116
Plaintiff Sec. & Exch. Comm’n’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Appointment of a Receiver at 2, SEC v. Spongetech, 98 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (No. 10-CV-02031 (DLI)), ECF No. 91.
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Spongetech’s Chapter 11 trustee’s interim report illustrates
the immediate effect of winning this race: “Pursuant to the
priority rules established by the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured
creditors must be paid in full before any funds or returns can be
received by shareholders.”117 The critical nature of who wins this
race to the courthouse between the SEC and creditors rests in
that one sentence. Had the SEC won and a receiver been
installed, security holders would have been on equal-to or better
footing with creditors.118 By winning the race to the courthouse,
creditors beat the Byers anti-bankruptcy injunction, forced the
entity into bankruptcy, and pushed themselves ahead of security
holders under § 510(b).
The importance of just a few hours in this race is further
embodied in the Spongetech court’s decision to maintain the
Code’s priority for a secured creditor’s claim over an SEC
disgorgement claim.119 The Spongetech bankruptcy resulted in
the disbursement of the entire $1.046 million estate to Solution
Funding, a secured creditor, because creditors won the race to
the courthouse.120 Had those creditors acted a few hours later
and the SEC—holding a $5.19 million disgorgement claim—
installed its receiver, it is unlikely, as the SEC argued, that any
creditor—secured or not—would have seen any compensation.121
V. REINTEGRATION OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS
IN BANKRUPTCY
Interestingly, many parallels exist between Slain and
Kripke’s seminal article that led to mandatory subordination and
the integration issues facing securities fraud enforcement and
bankruptcy today. Regarding the SEC’s use of receiverships to
avoid bankruptcy and promote its own mission above others,
Slain and Kripke’s conclusion proves salient: “The policies of
state and federal securities regulation are important; they are
not transcendental.”122 Still, the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of
117
Trustee’s First Interim Report at 11, In re Spongetech Delivery Systems,
Inc., No. 10-13647 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010), ECF No. 69.
11 U.S.C. §§ 510(b), 1129(a).
118
See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
119
SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 540 (E.D.N.Y.
2014).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 535.
122
Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 299 (“In case of corporate bankruptcy, the
public interest favoring private remedies for the violation of these laws must be
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defrauded security holders under § 510(b) gives the SEC little
choice in acting to avoid the Code’s priority. So, just as Slain and
Kripke wrote in 1973: “The time has come for a
reconsideration . . . .”123
This Part seeks to provide the start to a solution that
realigns SEC civil enforcement strategy with the Bankruptcy
Code while furthering the interests of security holders and
creditors. Furthermore, it aims to end the collective action
problem that has evolved between the SEC and creditors in and
out of bankruptcy. Ironically, in order to better protect creditors,
the first step is to revisit the Code’s provision that was intended
to protect them: § 510(b).124
A.

Revisiting § 510(b)

The Code’s treatment of defrauded security holders under
§ 510(b) gives the SEC few alternatives to avoid or ameliorate the
Code’s broad subordination of defrauded security holder claims.
Thus, Congress must revisit § 510(b). In doing so, Congress
should consider three objectives: (1) permit securities fraud
victims fair representation in bankruptcy cases; (2) incentivize
creditors to act as more effective fraud monitors; and (3) remove
the SEC’s primary motivation to use receiverships, which conflict
with the Code’s priority scheme.125
First, providing defrauded securities holders a voice in
bankruptcy and improving their prospects for recovery would
significantly impact a number of cases where victims of a debtor’s
fraud have no economic incentive to participate in the
bankruptcy process.126 Any change should aim to allow private
enforcement to help deter wrongdoing and provide “an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover
their losses without having to rely upon government action.”127
Permitting defrauded security holders to act as private attorneys
general would free up valuable SEC resources, supplement the
balanced against other interests worthy of protection—notably the reliance interests
of . . . lenders and trade creditors.”).
123
Id. at 285.
124
See COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 510.04[1].
125
See Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127.
126
See James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111
MICH. L. REV. 547, 582–83 (2013) (finding that a significant percentage of securities
class actions involve failed companies and that there are many cases in which a
company has not formally filed for bankruptcy but is in financial distress).
127
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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Commission’s enforcement objectives, and allow the SEC to bring
more selective actions against individuals, effectively achieving
greater overall deterrence.128
Next, also in the spirit of deterrence, improving defrauded
security holders’ ability to recover in bankruptcy should
incentivize creditors to better monitor entities to which they
decide to extend credit. This would be the case, in particular, if
defrauded investors were entitled to some recovery from the
proceeds of the debtor’s unlawful activity, even in situations
where a secured creditor is asserting a lien on that property. The
increased attentiveness of creditors, effectively acting as fraud
monitors, may promote the early detection of serious securities
law violations.
Finally, and above all, Congress must revisit § 510(b) to
reduce the SEC’s incentive to use receiverships and avoid the
Code’s priority. Such action puts the SEC at odds with creditors,
leads to conflicts within the federal system, and results in
insolvency proceedings lacking the certainty and structure of
bankruptcy proceedings.129 With defrauded security holders
empowered to assert their rights, the SEC no longer has a direct
need to use receiverships—especially when a bankruptcy
proceeding would be more appropriate.
B. In Bankruptcy: Empowering the United States Trustee
In a second step to integrate securities fraud enforcement in
bankruptcy, the United States Trustee should be empowered to
carry out its statutorily prescribed duties to better coordinate its
efforts with the SEC. The U.S. Trustee is responsible for
overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private
trustees; its mission is to promote the integrity and efficiency of
the bankruptcy system for debtors, creditors, and the public.130
But with respect to SEC regulation of insolvent firms
accused of defrauding investors, the U.S. Trustee’s authority is
not sufficient to fulfill its intended and self-described purpose to
128

See Park, supra note 126, at 585. Focusing securities fraud liability on these
individuals could better deter securities fraud, and so bankruptcy cases are a setting
where individuals, rather than the company, should be the focus of liability.
Wunderlich, supra note 24, at 376.
129
See Hedge Funds, supra note 77, at 127 (recognizing bankruptcy benefits
such as established case law, experienced judges, and the participation of the United
States Trustee).
130
28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012); U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program.
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act as the “watchdog over the bankruptcy process.”131 The U.S.
Trustee lacks the proper influence to work in coordination with—
or to challenge—the SEC when necessary to protect the Code.
For example, the U.S. Trustee was absent in the Byers litigation
that stripped creditors of the Code’s grant of power in § 303.
To better integrate the SEC’s mission with the Bankruptcy
Code, the U.S. Trustee needs the ability to act as a counterweight
to SEC influence. Furthermore, for the SEC’s part, the Agency
must have faith in an equitable distribution in bankruptcy.
Accordingly, the U.S. Trustee should be reequipped with the tools
needed to realize its mission as Congress intended: to “serve as
bankruptcy watch-dogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty, and
overreaching in the bankruptcy arena”132 and to operate like the
SEC under the Bankruptcy Act, “protecting the public interest
and ensuring that bankruptcy cases are conducted according to
the law.”133
C. Out of Bankruptcy: Receivership Oversight and Fairness
It is possible that even a wholesale repeal of § 510(b) would
not provide a persuasive incentive for the SEC to prefer a
bankruptcy over a receivership in which it exerts significant
influence to directly benefit the security holders the Agency seeks
to protect. But, like Slain and Kripke wrote, federal securities
law policy is not transcendental to all other interests—here, the
interests of creditors.134 Win or lose, this continued race to the
courthouse will only end in diminished SEC enforcement
resources.
The creation of an SEC position focused on promoting
fairness in receiverships and equipped with oversight capabilities
to establish certainty within the process could result in a more
effective, efficient distribution process that benefits defrauded

131
U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/
about-program. “[T]he U.S. Trustee’s powers are strictly circumscribed, and the
program has been embattled from its inception.” Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45.
132
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 88 (1977). See Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45
(citing Peter C. Alexander, A Proposal to Abolish the Office of United States Trustee,
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1996) as a critical assessment of the U.S. Trustee’s
performance).
133
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 109 (1977). See Rise and Fall, supra note 26, at 45
(“In large bankruptcies, the U.S. Trustee’s principal role often is to quibble about
requests for attorney’s fees—a far cry from the majestic role that William Douglas
had carved out for the SEC in the Chandler Act of 1938.”).
134
Slain & Kripke, supra note 12, at 299.
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security holders and creditors alike. In addition, a position like
this could ensure satisfaction of the Second Circuit’s past
instructions admonishing the receivership replacement of the
bankruptcy process.135
This position could also act to coordinate with the U.S.
Trustee to integrate the Agency’s goals back into bankruptcy.
With a bridge between SEC receiverships and the bankruptcy
process, the Commission and the U.S. Trustee could objectively
analyze and decide whether a receivership or a bankruptcy
proceeding would be the best option for the insolvent entity and
defrauded claimants—both creditors and security holders—under
any set of circumstances. The upshot would be employing the
best parts of the receivership and the Code. Such a system would
inject a confidence in SEC receivers for creditors, and likewise
provide a similar sense of security for defrauded security holders
in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
This Note is intended to educate stakeholders about how
equitable receiverships are being utilized. Furthermore, it hopes
to advance the conversation on integrating securities fraud
enforcement with bankruptcy law. To meaningfully continue
such a conversation, any solution to harmonize the SEC’s civil
enforcement strategy with the Bankruptcy Code must start with
§ 510(b). Effectively reprioritizing securities fraud claims to
provide a remuneration path for security holders in bankruptcy
will eliminate the SEC’s incentive to use mechanisms like the
equitable receivership and take the first step in bringing those
claims back into bankruptcy proceedings.
Without that
incentive, the increased, coordinative efforts between a newlyempowered U.S. Trustee and the SEC can provide the framework
for a more efficient system to equitably compensate all defrauded
claimants in and out of bankruptcy. In sum, the race between
the SEC and creditors will end.

135
See SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Eberhard v. Marcu,
530 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “receivership should not be used as an
alternative to bankruptcy”); SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 436–38 (2d
Cir. 1987) (instructing the SEC to inform district courts of the Second Circuit’s
reservations that equity receiverships should not be used to effect the liquidation of
defendants in actions brought under the securities laws).

